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FOREWORD
To define future threat is, in a sense, an impossible
task, yet it is one that must be done. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray explains that the only sources
of empirical evidence accessible to us are the past and
the present. We cannot obtain understanding about
the future from the future.
Dr. Gray draws noticeably upon the understanding of strategic history obtainable from Thucydides’
great History of the Peloponnesian War. The monograph
advises prudence as the operating light for American
definition of future threat, and the author believes
that there are historical parallels between the time of
Thucydides and our own that can help us avoid much
peril. The future must always be unpredictable to us
in any detail, but the many and potent continuities in
history’s great stream of time can serve to alert us to
what may well happen in kind.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph to assist policymakers and strategic
thinkers in understanding this vital topic.
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph examines the challenge in future
threat definition. In order to do so, it is necessary to
understand where identification of threat originates,
and how and why such identification is made in the
context of international political relations. This analysis makes fairly heavy use of the ideas in Thucydides’
great History of the Peloponnesian War. Effort is expended here to explain why a work written in Greece, in
the late-5th century B.C., has high value for us today
as a vital aid to understanding of our own current,
and indeed future, security context.
The monograph offers conclusions/recommendations in four broad clusters. First, prudence is recommended as the guiding light in the face of an irreducible
ignorance about the future. Second, the monograph
explains that there is considerable real (political and
cultural) discretion about the particular identification and definition of threat. Third, the analysis flatly
rejects the idea of historical analogy as a vital source
of evidence on future threat; instead, the concept of
the historical parallel, the difference between the two
ideas, is very large. Fourth, although the contemporary United States is indeed unique and exceptional
as an actor on the world state, it is nonetheless simply
a very large and powerful state that is obliged to behave according to the same rule book, and plan with
a familiar playbook, as have other great powers of the
past and present.
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THUCYDIDES WAS RIGHT:
DEFINING THE FUTURE THREAT
The fact that, historically speaking, correct threat perception is exceptional—resting perhaps on luck or
intuitive judgement, that is, on unreliable resources—
stands in sharp contrast to the common assumption
that threat perception is easy.
		

Klaus Knorr, 19761

Yet the only empirical data we have about how
people conduct war and behave under its stresses is
our experience with it in the past, however much we
have to make adjustments for subsequent changes in
conditions.
		

Bernard Brodie, 19762

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
The subject that lies unavoidably at the core of this
analysis is the challenge of understanding both what
Americans will, or certainly should, understand about
threat in the future and what kinds of policy and strategy actions might be implied as appropriate. Unfortunately, elements key to this inquiry are far from being
all but self-explanatory, even when or if the familiarity of popular concepts appears to attribute a quite undeserved merit to them. By way of firing two “shots
across the bow” of this subject and accepting the risk
of my appearing unduly negative, it is necessary to
decline to be unduly impressed by the two highly potent ideas that must drive this study—threat and the
future. The sheer familiarity of these concepts can paralyze our critical capacity. I should hasten to explain
that the high purpose here does not lie in the explora1

tion of interesting ideas in a quest after understanding
for its own sake. Rather, this inquiry is motivated and
organized with the intention of discovering a way,
or ways, in which the United States, and particularly
its Army, could act in order to counter the problems
that attend and infest the concepts of the future and of
threat. The fundamental subject is the challenge to the
United States that inalienably is issued by the need to
be able to cope well enough with what may come to be
regarded in the future as threats.
Notwithstanding the uncontentious linked dual
concepts of threat and the future, it is necessary to
recognize that both concepts are characterized by immense contemporary lack of knowledge on our part.
The beginning of wisdom has to be frank recognition
of our total ignorance about detail of and from the future. This is an obvious and unarguable truth that carries profound meaning for politics and strategy, but
all too rarely is properly understood. In fact, so truly
resistant are people to the full meaning of the “future”
that often they succumb to the temptation in effect
to deny temporal actuality. The somewhat awkward
truths are that we can obtain no information about
the future from the future, and indeed that the future
never arrives.3 Officials and scholars do not challenge
this law of physics, but they are prone to forget it, or
at least to behave in their endeavors in planning as if
it were only a matter of minor inconvenience. In the
analysis and discussion here, I attempt to address the
awesomely challenging problem of how the United
States and its Army can be ready enough to cope adequately with the difficulty of not knowing for certain
what it may be required to do, or against whom it may
have to be prepared to do it. It is necessary to begin by
acknowledging that any, and indeed every, explana-
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tion of future threat has to be able to refer to a body
of evidence in its regard. What unlocks somewhat the
mystery of future threat can only live in the evidence
we have more or less accessible to us, indirectly, in the
record of strategic history, past and present.
We are used to employing the apparently opposed,
though actually complementary, ideas of continuity
and change. To enrich greatly this dynamic duo, we
need also to contextualize treatment of future threat
by adopting the master notion of the great stream of
time.4 This imperially inclusive organizing concept
requires us to accept as legitimate the idea that strategic history is unending, just as it had no confidently
identifiable beginning. What the concept of the stream
of time can do for us is provide all important temporal
context. While on the one hand, it accommodates considerable change in the character of strategic affairs,
on the other, it insists upon our appreciation of the
many, indeed fundamental, continuities in our history. On grasping the meaning of the concept of the
great stream of time, scholars, soldiers, and politicians
should feel rather less lonely and perhaps afraid in
their unavoidable ignorance of the future.
There can be no hiding from a fundamental problem that must drive this discussion; specifically, how
can we prepare for our future security when, all too
literally, we neither have, nor are able to obtain, a
thoroughly reliable understanding of our society’s
security needs in the future? Restated in short form,
how do we go about our defense planning when we
cannot know what perils the future will bring? It is
appropriate, if more than a little worrisome, to recognize as reality the enduring contextual truth that defense planning must and will be done, no matter the
state of our grasp of current, let alone future, dangers.5
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Bearing in mind the certain fact that our future strategic history can be played out only once regardless of
the imaginative alternatives that futurists can devise,
it should be clearly understood that history, in common with strategy, is all about consequences that will
not usually be easy to understand with well-founded
confidence.
Thus far I have chosen to emphasize the scale and
the quality of the problem that must confront defense
planners. The basic reason for such negativity does not
lie in deep-seated pessimism on this analyst’s part, but
rather in a determination to insist upon full realization
of the nature of the challenge to policy and therefore
to our strategy. How can we “define the future threat”
when that future is a book closed to us forever? It is
ironic that, although we are, and will remain, entirely
ignorant of the future in detail, by contrast with that
bleak ignorance we can, and should, be thoroughly
knowledgeable about the context of threat in our society’s future. How and why is this remarkable contrast
possible? My citation of Thucydides’ great History of
the Peloponnesian War, when considered in tandem
with the concept of an unending great stream of time,
can provide the basis for an adequate answer.6 The
particular merit for this analysis in Thucydides’ history has been well-flagged by many scholars, as well
as political and military professionals.7 However, the
core of the lasting value in the Athenian general author’s literary historical work has been well expressed
succinctly by Robert Gilpin. This American professor
has claimed that “The classic history of Thucydides is
as meaningful a guide to the behavior of states today
[1981] as when it was written in the fifth century B.C.”8
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Gilpin also offers the following thought that many
of our contemporary scholars most probably would
deem close to absurd, were they ever prepared to
consider it seriously.
But, in honesty, one must inquire whether or not
twentieth-century students of international relations
know anything that Thucydides and his fifth-century
compatriots did not know about the behavior of states.
What advice could today’s students give that would
have enabled the Greeks to have prevented the great
war that destroyed their civilization?9

We know for certain that Thucydides believed that
his then contemporary history of the great war that
all but destroyed Greek civilization was, in effect, the
story of the persisting, indeed permanent, history of
mankind. If we find this belief plausible, at the very
least, then it means that we have valuable, if admittedly variable, access to an abundance of evidence
with high educational merit for our defense planners
today. We do not and cannot know the strategic future
in detail, but we should have more or less available to
us the understanding of what was probably considered and actually attempted, over the course of 2 1/2
millennia of global strategic history. Obviously, very
large questions about change and continuity intrude
aggressively. How do we cope intellectually and practicably with the cumulatively gigantic changes that
unquestionably have occurred in strategic history?
It is necessary to begin with a treatment of the
most basic questions that can be posed. Probably the
most fundamental of issues pertains to the distinction
that one might wish to make between continuity and
change. Directly posed for the sake of this analysis,
just how similar in kind are critically important hap5

penings in 5th century B.C. Greece to the events in our
world in the 21st century? We are apt to talk rather
freely, perhaps even glibly, about the politics, policy,
strategy, and tactics of then and now, even as if the
huge differences in thought, behavior, and material
either did not happen or, at most, are relatively unimportant. Undeniably, a peril of possible historical
anachronism must loom menacingly over this discussion.10 It is my contention that although material,
and therefore necessarily tactical, change has been
continuous, if irregular in pace, over the course of
strategic history; the larger challenges have remained
all but constant. There has been, and there continues
to be, some triangular tensions among technological
change, tactical ideas on the best way to exploit new
capabilities, and the cultural preference, assumptions,
and expectations that often seem to rule important aspects of our strategic security.
The reader of Thucydides today can hardly help
but notice how familiar the dilemmas and anxieties of
his world appear to us. It is prudent to be skeptical of
an easy assumption of likeness between his political
and strategic world and ours, but, alas, it is even easier
to be dismissive summarily of apparent similarities.
It is a considerable aid to understanding if one is able
to probe for the motive and method behind strategic
behavior. Such a forensic endeavor is rendered more
feasible than it might be, certainly intellectually more
legitimate, if one is prepared to accept as a working
hypothesis the large notion already introduced here
of there being a continuous great stream of time. Once
the awful and awesome Peloponnesian War is placed
where it properly belongs, as a dreadful episode in
strategic history, we can see our own experience in
strategic history as helpful in longer-term temporal
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context. What is contemporary for us actually is neither more nor less authentic and distinctive an experience than were the sundry alarms and traumas of
the ancient Greeks. Of course, threats and dangers
always are specific to particular circumstances historically, but there is high value in being able, from time
to time, to elevate one’s gaze above the “threat of the
week” and the alarm of this afternoon in order to attempt to secure a better understanding of the structure
and working of the process that produces estimates of
future menace. Behind the central working hypothesis
of this analysis, which affirms the strength of strategic historical continuity, is a robustly empirical theory
that explains the more fundamental reasons for that
enduring reality.
To understand future threat, it should be realized
that the 2 1/2 millennia of strategic history fairly accessible to us can and should be utilized in order to
generate some theory with explanatory power, at
least potential, over the rich and characteristically
ever-changing flow of events. Fortunately, we do have
enough to hand some grip and grasp on the principal
factors that, in combination, often malign and drive
our strategic history.11 Specifically, strategic history
can be approached and understood as the ever dynamic outcome of relations among human nature, political process, and strategic logic and method. It is my
argument that none of these three broad driving forces
in history are discretionary. As human beings, we are
what we are and, effectively, always have been. Cultures have come and gone, but the human nature that
adopted and adapted them has been all but constant.
My second factor, political process, has been manifested in a wide range of forms, but we ought not to
be misled into believing that our species is capable of
achieving such a perfection of political form that all
7

questions about threat would become strictly moot.
Political process is universal because the human condition—Man’s Estate—is ever perceived either to be
under threat, or at least likely to be so. This intimation
of menace, in a near or far term, requires making decisions in the interest of alleviating anxiety or actually
meeting menace. The process of providing for community security is what we understand as politics. To
provide security, there has to be a political process.12
The details of this process do not really matter for the
integrity of this argument. Political process determines
who is relatively the more influential among the concerned citizens, and the more or less well-established
facts of the local political process confer the necessary
legitimacy.13 Of course, beliefs and values have varied immensely over the whole wide range of human
security communities. But, the ubiquity and necessity
for legitimating political process has been a reality
throughout all strategic history.
The third and final factor in my austerely economical theory of strategic history is the universal
necessity for strategic logic and method. By strategic
logic and method, I mean the approach to challenges
that endeavors to protect or secure desirable political
Ends, employing effective Ways, through persuasive
application of generally coercive Means.14 The basic
triad of Ends, Ways, and Means needs appreciation
in the context of the prevailing assumptions, meaning
beliefs that may or may not be well-founded factually. The strategy triad can look as neat and generally efficient in its glorious inclusivity, particularly in
PowerPoint form, as actually it is likely to mislead the
unwary. The basic structure of the theory of strategy
is as appealing in its wonderful simplicity as it is certain to frustrate in attempted practice. No matter how
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persuasive the core triadic theory of strategy appears
to be, the military practitioner will long remain in a
condition of ignorance as to the depth and scope of the
difficult challenges he needs to know how to meet.15
To cite only the most obvious of practical challenges
that an unduly cursory mastery of the PowerPoint
presentation of the theory of strategy most likely fails
to register very clearly:
1. Policy Ends: These are selected as a result of political process, not necessarily on the basis of strategic
feasibility. These Ends almost always are regarded by
their political parents as “work in progress.”
2. Strategic Ways: Because strategy is, in its nature,
an adversarial activity, there will rarely be ways that
can be presumed reliably ahead of time to be effective.
3. Military Means: Military effect, let alone strategic and political effect, is not definitively predictable.
Estimation of anticipated nominal and notional capabilities may prove not to offer reliable guidance for the
future. Strategists sometimes need to be reminded of
the eternal authority of tactical performance.16 While
strategy is needed to ensure that tactics are politically useful, it is well to remember that all strategy,
everywhere and at all times, has to be done tactically.
Strictly understood, there is no action at the strategic
level of war, common misuse of “strategic” as an adjective, notwithstanding (e.g., there are no “strategic
troops,” because all troops behave with strategic effect and therefore logically should be understood to
be “strategic”).
4. Assumptions: Because the future, by its nature,
denies us reliable knowledge, the defense planner has
no option but to assume that many, perhaps most,
of his beliefs will prove to be true enough. Scientific,
which is to say empirically repeatedly testable, under-
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standing of the future security context literally is unobtainable. This means that much of a state’s defense
planning is obliged to proceed on the basis of anticipation, hope, expectation, and possibly confident beliefs
about the future—which cannot be tested for their accuracy. It is as frustrating as it is important to recognize that tomorrow cannot come on human demand;
it is always a future wherein currently unexpected
alternatives may occur.
It is necessary, but by no means in itself satisfactory, to endorse Raymond Aron’s famous praise of
prudence as constituting the primary virtue in statecraft.17 It is no simple matter to behave prudently. It
is undoubtedly highly desirable for defense planners
to be respectful of prudence as a value, even as the
most important value, but further thought reveals that
prudence does not come accompanied by advice as to
behavior reliably applicable to it. It is indeed wise to
appreciate the relative significance of the consequences of thought and actions, but, unfortunately, the need
to anticipate consequences requires some capability in
the field of anticipation and even prediction, which is
why this monograph now turns directly to confront
the challenge of possible future threat. How can we
endeavor to deal with the uncomfortable fact that we
must cope with an unknown and indeed significantly
unknowable country—the future?
CONTEXT
The first Bill Clinton administration found itself
more than marginally embarrassed by the condition
of unchallenged international strategic preeminence,
which it inherited from the relatively exciting and
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successful George H. W. Bush years. Strategic preeminence had been an aspiration in the Jimmy Carter and,
even more, the Ronald Reagan years, but it would be a
gross exaggeration to try to claim that it was seriously
anticipated, let alone predicted and expected. Far from
being self-congratulatory at the apparent arrival of a
somewhat unexpected hegemony, the United States
and its defense community gave a convincing public
impression of notable bemusement, bafflement even,
by achievement of unchallenged and unexpected
unipolarity. The country had mobilized in the diverse
ways of grand strategy in order to see off a Soviet
menace that had appeared to be gaining in strength
through the 1970s. Under grand strategic pressure,
however, the Soviet challenge first weakened and
then nearly vanished during the Bush presidency. The
United States and its principal allies were counting the
actual and believed imminent strategic rewards that
should flow from meeting satisfactorily. Soviet challenge that had been burgeoning since the late-1960s
died politically, or at least gave almost every appearance of doing so. Of course, there were some prudent
residual American doubts as to the permanence of
the change, transformation even, in Moscow, but as
the 1990s proceeded, it was unquestionable that the
Soviet demise was a genuine and apparently lasting
collapse and retreat from imperium.
Although it is exhilarating when the major, indeed
the only premier-league, menace to national security
suddenly disappears, it is more than slightly disconcerting and even baffling. The fact that it has happened before—think of 1865, 1919, and 1945-47—can
offer scant consolation. For more than 40 years, the
American defense establishment had grappled with
the certain knowledge that the Soviet Union was by
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far in a league of its own—the only serious danger for
the Republic. One, arguably two, whole generations of
American officials and Soldiers had understood that,
ultimately, the United States had only a single enemy
with which to contend, arguably worthy of respect
as a near, certainly self-intending, strategic peer: the
Soviet Union.
For understandable reasons of its geography and
history, the United States is ill-prepared to cope with
the problems for national security in these mid–2010s
and beyond. Of course, the evidence to be provided
by contemporary history cannot be trusted to suggest
how we should proceed in our planning and deployments for national and international security. Only
rarely in the country’s history is there need for a debate on the basic objectives, and the necessary strategy to meet what has become, or plainly is becoming,
a new situation. It is obvious, for example, that this
monograph must pause in order to address the evermore pressing issues of national security context. It
would make little sense to attempt to meet the obvious challenge posed in the title here—”defining the
future threat”—unless one first can establish just what
it is that Americans care about that may be threatened,
and indeed why and how much they should care.
I must confess to surrender to the authority of the
notional thought that strategic reason and logic are
intimately engaged with this subject. I assume that
threats in the future will be no more random than will
be our organized efforts to thwart them. It is necessary
not to flinch from risking an apparently exceedingly
elementary level of inquiry here. It should be obvious that, because I am thinking strategically, I am assuming the authority of an international adversarial
context. Lurking in this discussion is appreciation of a
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fundamental element necessary for such a context. By
and large, it is sensible to consider the austere theory
of strategy with its Ends, Ways, and Means in a context of relationships. To clarify: each of the three organizing elements in the traditional formula of and for
theory requires either a plain notional or more likely
some actual physical and ideational opposition. My
immediate destination here is to “pause” or perhaps
“stop” the definitive political and strategic end to the
Cold War that menaced our security for more than
40 years.
Twenty years ago, many people believed that the
United States had a “unipolar moment” of unpredictable duration.18 Relatively minor distraction in the
Balkans and in the Middle East continued to frustrate
U.S. policy and strategy, but such annoyance was not
judged terribly serious by Americans. Jihadist terrorists emerged from the rubble of erstwhile Soviet ravaged Afghanistan, though more to be noted than really
noticed as objects of menace requiring urgent political
and strategic attention. The American attitude in the
1990s amounted in potential strategic practice to the
view that the sole remaining superpower does not
clean windows just because there are no more demanding missions on offer. The all too practical problem for the U.S. defense community in the 1990s was
a serious absence of political motivation. In political
effect, in the 1990s, the United States found itself deprived of foreign threat, a condition last enjoyed in the
early-1930s (though I could register the fact of some
American hostility toward the empire of Japan following that country’s aggression over Manchuria in 1931).
While defense professionals will never be caught entirely naked of threat perceptions and concerns, such
is not the case for the civilian public or, in good part as
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an understandable and appropriate consequence, for
that public’s elected representatives at every level of
political responsibility. This is popular democracy in
action, and it was as unmistakable a phenomenon in
the Athens of the 5th century B.C. as it proved in our
1990s.19 When an electorate is far less frightened than
it had been recently, it will expect and, if politically
necessary, demand that public expenditure on military defense preparation be reduced markedly. In the
1990s, overwhelming foreign danger, duly conceived
and not infrequently presented as a threat, seemed
simply to disappear. Hardened defense professionals
failed to celebrate unduly but not because their personal livelihoods were at risk. The reason for moderation in celebration by defense experts lay in their conviction that strategic challenge had not been defeated
definitively, but rather was only resting while new
contextual fuel for conflict was amassed by troublemakers, familiar and novel.
In a universe characterized more by prudential reasoning than is ours, one could have expected a “1990s”
decade to be employed as a period of strategic pause
for the purpose, inter alia, of using the luxury of the
relaxation of serious security concern, let alone alarm,
to revisit the fundamental assumptions of American
grand strategy.20 One needs to bear in mind the fact
that the country had been fixed in a particular character of response mode for more than 40 years by the
Soviet threat in its several forms. However, democracies tend not to interpret the absence of acute foreign
danger simply as a “time out” from conflict as usual,
but rather as apparently unmistakable evidence of inevitable political progress. Politicians know that they
will not receive support if their message is one electors do not like. The truth of the matter was revealed
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for all subsequent time by Thucydides, of course. He
knew that history always is punctuated by episodes
marked by appalling errors in human judgment and
by chance, as well as by periods characterized mainly
by prudence in the conduct of public affairs. Proper
grasp of the implications of the concept of the great
(and unending and in fundamental effect) stream of
time can and should protect us both from excessive
alarm as well as naïve faith that some contemporary
evidence of political wisdom offers unmistakable evidence of the approach of the long awaited “End of
History.” Comprehension that history has no end (we
hope, thinking of residual nuclear concern) also must
carry with it the understanding that serious national
security concerns may only episodically be alarming,
but certainly it will feature repeatedly in the future.
In short, the United States does not and will not face
security problems that, once coped with adequately,
must be followed by an endless ever improving period of peace and prosperity. The political and moral
context for this discussion has to be assumed to be one
of eternal periodic alarm in varying degree. This is the
permanent reality of all strategic history, the American included. It is, and must remain, a strategic history and is not to be confused with a fairy tale that
climaxes with a definitively happy ending.
As a matter of empirical record, the decade of the
1990s that should have been characterized as a strategic pause that allowed for a reconsideration of national
grand strategy instead was a decade marked by technical and largely tactical obsession with the promise
that there might be in digital information technology.
For the better part of 10 years, in effect, the American
defense community all but squandered its inevitably
temporary unipolar moment, self-obsessively contem-
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plating how tactically formidable it might become as
a result of digitization.21 The revolution in military affairs (RMA), military revolution, and military technical revolution collectively were treated as being the
strategic flavor of the decade. The inattention to more
serious matters of policy and strategy was revealed in
painful form in the political and strategic errors that
succeeded September 11, 2001 in the counterinsurgency (COIN) decade of the 2000s. Digitization in its
many applications has proved, unsurprisingly, to be
of high tactical importance. The problem cited in this
section on context essentially has nothing to do with
the ever greater technical and tactical exploitation of
information technology, but rather with the subjects
of yet higher professional concern to us that have been
neglected unduly in the fields of strategy and politics.
In noteworthy part, the neglect was, seriatim, of obsession with the exciting technical and tactical promise
in RMA, and then with the challenge of attempting to
counter terrorism and insurgency in distant and culturally ill-understood lands.
The better historians among us have tried to advise
that policy and strategy inherently are relatively more
important than are technology and tactics.22 This does
not amount to the claim that tactics are unimportant,
only to the proposition that strategic history has demonstrated that, while tactical and much technical error
proved correctible and survivable, almost invariably,
political and strategic mistakes were fatal, no matter
how worthy the ultimate political and moral intentions may have been.
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SPECTRUM OF CONCERN
Unless there is unmistakably good evidence suggesting the probability of particular threat in the future, it is necessary to recognize the fact and impressive degree of uncertainty that is in the nature of this
crucial subject.
Capability and Intention.
Threat should be defined as an intention to do
harm that logically and practicably requires command
of the physical ability. As a general rule, threats have
to be received clearly enough by their intended addressees. However, both common sense and strategic
historical experience suggest that the unambiguous
delivery and receipt of threats also are necessary if
they are to perform the function intended by their
authors. More to the relevant point and as the theory
behind nuclear strategy long has sought to explain,
the credibility of some threats almost necessarily will
long be in doubt.23 It is important not to forget that
threat manufacture, transmission, receipt, and interpretation is always an essentially human enterprise.
The deadly (nuclear-armed) machines of mass menace that compass the crown jewels of potential threat
projection will be inert instruments that function
awesomely only as a result of the outcome(s) to human adversarial behavior. This whole discussion of
threat and responses to it is suffused with recognition
of the salience on both sides of distinctively human
thought and behavior.24 Nearly all military capability lends itself to some potential mission of coercion,
though most of the time and in most places inherent
ambiguity about motives for employment simply re-
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mains as a strategically valuable residual quality of
military power.
It is usual to define threat with usefully pointed
economy as being well enough expressed by the formula: threat = capability x political intention. There is
virtue in this austere expression, but little additional
thought is required in order to understand that political intention does not usually remain constant for long.
In other words, this simple formula may well mislead
us into regarding as constant what in reality usually is
anything but. Without wishing to divert this analysis
away from its central theme of “threat,” nonetheless,
it matters deeply that readers understand fully that,
in strategic history, most of the time, policy Ends are
not fixed permanently. Because conflict and war are,
in practice, kin to organic happenings that wax and
wane often unexpectedly as they develop, so policy
Ends quite typically will need to be adjusted in order
to reflect a clearer more contemporary understanding
of what appears to be possible.25
To extend the point just registered about usual
fluctuations that characterize policy and its Ends, it
is necessary to accept that this whole subject is liable
to real-time adjustment, even on items widely held to
be of fundamental significance. Perhaps the easiest
way to explain what I mean is to contrast the austere
formal architecture of strategy with the reality of strategic behavior in historical practice. Whereas one can
teach that strategy entails the pursuit of politically
agreed policy Ends, by suitable strategic Ways, employing the necessary military Means, students also
need to have a secure grasp on how theory actually is,
and has always been, practiced. In reality, each basic
element in the simple strategy formula—Ends, Ways,
and Means—is ever likely to be in need of adjustment
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for a better fit with changing circumstances and adaptation in vital detail.26 The argument was made earlier
that the “Ends” of policy should always be regarded
as potentially being only a “work in progress” as contrasted with some conclusive vision of intention. In
fact, the same tolerance of some flexibility is necessary
in regard to each of the big three categorizing concepts—Ends, Ways, and Means. Governing this whole
discussion is the eternal and ubiquitous truth that
statecraft and strategy are in the realm of what proves
possible to achieve, not necessarily of what ideally it
may be highly desirable to accomplish. Strategic history demonstrates clearly that defense planning as a
pragmatically prudent matter always requires us to be
satisfied with “good enough” solutions.27
The professional soldier typically favors precision
and consistency on the part of political superiors. This
liking for a clear, definite, and preferably unchanging
strategy cannot guarantee delivery of a steady and
well-directed military effort, but it should help.28 The
politician who is a policymaker is more likely to regard
politics and political effect as the home of Ends, rather
than the policy that he hopes will serve adequately to
support the politics. In other words, while the soldier
understandably tends to view policy objectives as
his relevant Ends, with political process holding on
a secondary role, the policymaker typically regards
politics and its process as the true authority, albeit one
expressed and explained in commonly (but permanently) temporary policy terms. The better definitions
of strategy take care to specify, at least to suggest, the
superior role played by political process in the making
and execution of strategy. My own preferred definition risks erring on the side of explicit recognition of
the relative but clearly superior importance of politics.
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I choose to define military strategy as “the direction
and use made of force and the threat of force for the
purposes of policy as decided by politics.” The context for political activity and decision is fundamentally different from that for military decision. It follows necessarily, though commonly unappreciated,
that the understanding of future threat also is likely
to diverge as between the different worldviews of the
professions of politician and soldier. Of course, threat
definition requires military analysis, but it is necessary
to remember that soldiers are not usually in charge of
a country’s statecraft. Statesmen are politicians who
have succeeded in playing the game of relative political influence more successfully than have their rivals.
An important migration in conceptual meaning
concerning strategy occurred in the 19th century, but
it is not as well understood as it needs to be. Specifically, the core meaning of strategy in the 1820s was
that its purpose was to direct choice of and for battle
in its expected consequences in war. In noteworthy
contrast, strategy came to be regarded post-World
War I primarily as a support for politics and its policy in peacetime and wartime. Modern strategy has
not lost its erstwhile battle focus, but that fixation of
Clausewitz’s day has been conclusively widened in
political scope.
As often as not, there will be a vital quality of ambiguity about actions and words intended to carry
menace. Professional soldiers favor, perhaps need,
definite orders and commands, the dangers associated
with it which can be calibrated by some military calculation. But, the politician, in his characteristic universe, wants to be able to advance further or to retreat
with minimum political embarrassment. Indeed, the
political leader can be endangered by self-deception
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that may confuse his strategy. Because they act preeminently with and through words, politicians are prone
to misread the scope of feasibility in policy zones that
transcend the world of politics. This danger understandably is especially acute in the relations between
politics and war. In fact, although all war is political
in meaning for all time, it is not an integral branch of
politics. Although war should serve politics, war is not
politics, notwithstanding the migration in meaning of
strategy noted previously. There is a permanent need
for currency conversion between military threat and
action and desired political effect. Although threat to
American security can be so obvious as to be all but
unarguable, that reliable, if still uncomfortable, relative stability in assumption about foreign menace is
by no means dominant in our contemporary threat
analysis and divination.
There is little room for doubt that Thucydides’
understanding of the causes of the great war of his
time between Athens and Sparta can offer guidance
superior to the alternatives from our contemporary
social science.29 In political life, both domestic and international motivation inevitably is always complex
and therefore potentially complicated and ultimately
indeterminate if one looks foolishly for a scientific
quality of evidence. But, if we choose to be content
with high plausibility of fit with what is known with
substantial confidence about political context, it is possible to identify probable motivation of the causation
of events. It should be recalled that threat has been
defined here as a product of capability multiplied by
intention. In other words and by way of example, a
force of intercontinental ballistic missiles is naked
of any specific strategic meaning until its political
owners decide upon such.
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It is worth noting that, over the past century, many
scholars and politicians who should have known better gave robust indication of their failure to grasp the
essential point just registered here. The whole modern history of arms control has revealed confusion of
understanding about the significance of arms in their
relation to political intentions. Identity of political
ownership of weapons largely, though not absolutely
invariably, is key to understanding strategic and political meaning. Military capability may well be rich
in strategic, operational, and tactical implications, but
the ascription of threat depends upon the political
ownership of the instruments of interest. Of course,
such ownership often will be innocent of malign intention, or at the least will only be deemed likely to be
contingently menacing.
Since context typically drives contingency, and
given that context should lend itself to influence by
behavior that shapes political judgment, the grim possibilities that one can identify with particular inert
military items may serve as providing timely warning
for statecraft. Episodically throughout recorded strategic history, developments have been interpreted as
being in an adversarial context, and the identification,
possibly misidentification, of great security threats
has ensued.
Thucydides was a deep and subtle analyst of the
meaning of his times, and he expressed little doubt
about the primary cause of the great war that was the
ruin of ancient Greece. The Athenian historian (and
failed general) acknowledged the many complaints
that Athens and Sparta lodged against each other, often with some justice, but he declined admirably to be
distracted even by particulars, admittedly contributing to the main thrust of his narrative and the clarity of explanation that he sought to convey. In words
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alive with meaning for all subsequent periods, especially for ours in the 21st century, Thucydides wrote
as follows:
To the question why [in 431 B.C.] they broke the treaty
[the Thirty Years’ Peace of 446 B.C.], I answer by placing first an account of their grounds of complaint and
points of difference, that no one may ever have to ask
the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into
a war of such magnitude. The real cause, however, I
consider to be the one which was formally most kept
out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and
the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable. Still it is well to give the grounds alleged by
either side, which led to the dissolution of the treaty
and the breaking out of the war.30

The Athenian Empire demonstrated an intolerance
of political and strategic dissent from its client allies
and certainly inadvertently provided ample fuel for
hostility. However, as Thucydides recognized and acknowledged, the security problems for Athens in the
longer term was fundamentally the immoderateness
of her power as perceived by other Greeks, and then
all too naturally the unmistakable evidence of an overweening confidence evidenced in Athenian policy and
strategy as an easily traceable consequence. But, what
is the relevance of the Athenian case to the American
defining of future threat? Indeed, is there any relevance
worthy of much note? The most pertinent problems for
American security need to be understood as political,
though there is a major, perhaps even overwhelming,
systemic complication. Through all of strategic history
to date, the principal and indeed enduring threat to
security has lurked in unbalanced power. Balancing
power cannot guarantee peace and tolerable prosperity, but we do know that the evidence proved by
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unmistakable historical cases of unbalanced power, or
certainly the fear of such, inherently are hostile to that
peace and prosperity.
Unfortunately, the Thucydidean worldview, which
was and remains all too realistic, tells us that our future security is certain to be threatened by the usual,
indeed normal, working of the politics of international life. The distinctive advantages and benefits
that America enjoys are collectively the motive that
will find expression in future threat. This is not quite
to suggest that the sense of hegemonic preeminence
and duty that led the United States to endeavor to
sustain a non-Communist South Vietnam in the 1960s,
and a generation later to redirect and re-make Middle
Eastern and then Central Asian history in Iraq and
Afghanistan, was unworthy. But, it is to suggest that
it was unwise. Prudence in policy is much easier to
locate in historical retrospect than it was at the time.
Frequently in strategic history, good intentions have
been permitted to masquerade as prudence. For the
record, even near-term achievable political and strategic results cannot necessarily be trusted to deserve
judgment as prudent.
Risk and Danger.
Virtue and villainy do not bring their most appropriate consequences inevitably, but it is prudent to assume that such might be the case. Notwithstanding its
continuing relative greatness as a superpower, questions fundamental to this discussion have to include
the following: What will be the political context for
America’s definition of threat in the future; and what
might America strive to do to exercise some helpful
measure of influence in, perhaps even control over,
that future political context?
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There is good reason why time plainly has to be
understood as comprising the least forgiving of strategy’s many dimensions. The temporal factor is inalienable as a critical element in all defense planning. Although this has always been true throughout strategic
history, never has it been more vitally salient than today. Defense planning must be geared for tolerable fit
with the anticipated timing of foreign security risk and
danger. Indeed, it should be all but second nature for
planners to be able to categorize menaces to national
security on a time scale from current alarm through
near- and medium-term worry and serious concern,
to the more agreeable distant horizon of anxieties
about the relatively far-term future. Future security
threats are anticipatable, let alone predictable, only
with diminishing confidence, as one ventures necessarily and somewhat imaginatively into an evermore
distant future.
Moreover, if particular political antagonism and
hostility is less than confidently predictable, it is difficult to specify possible or probable measurements
attached to the strategic future. When the political
context changes, so must the strategic one. Given that
strategic meaning is conferred by political effort, it is
obvious that exercises in military-technological futurology are likely to miss most of the needed argument
concerning prudent defense provision. However,
contrary perhaps to a line of reasoning that would
privilege an undisciplined openness of strategic competition, this discussion is sustained by the conviction
that there is and will remain what can be regarded
as a categorical imperative shaping of international
political and strategic competition. Without quite endorsing a fully deterministic view of the terms for the
future security of America, nonetheless there are sub-
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stantial grounds for confident identification of principal strategic historical markers of the policy passage
that need to be pursued in the interest of prudence.
It is advisable that I remind readers of the genuine
uncertainties and possible challenges that our defense
planners have to recognize and work around, if not
overcome. At some risk of encouraging pessimism, I
would not endorse seeking to define future threat. The
United States has to be able to cope with the following
uncertainties:
• Identity of menacers (or possibly threateners)
• Seriousness of menace
• Time horizons of menace
• Feasibility of adequate response (e.g., time, cost,
likely consequences).
Contemporary uncertainties must preclude the
kind of exercise in threat definition that can produce
all but tangible and convincing answers. It must follow, therefore, that the relevant challenge to the U.S.
Army should not primarily be one of threat predictions and spotting! The reason why Thucydides’ great
book figures so significantly here is not because I am
striving to assert the relevance of an ancient Greek historical analogy for today and tomorrow, but rather because the context of competition concerning security
is so categorically analogous. The differences between
5th century B.C. and today are indeed enormous, but
so are the similarities. Aside from the quality of catastrophe that we must assume would follow nuclear
use, there is little about the relations between Athens
and Sparta that is notably mysterious to us today.
However, what matters most for the subject of this
discussion is the plausibility that the political and
strategic relations among the greater powers have not
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altered fundamentally since that now distant period.
This is a vitally important subject about which to theorize and argue, because it bears with maximum directness upon the issue of whether or not strategic history in the great stream of time can provide sufficient
evidence of empirical examples of interstate behavior,
prudent or foolish.
The study of history shows us what can happen,
which we know for certain because it has happened.
It is not available as a reliable guide to accurate prediction, because the course of strategic history is subject to too many and too diverse a range of possible
influences, not least the ever potentially individual
human, to provide adequate fuel for confident prediction.31 The United States should not seek, because it
would not find, specific instructions in Thucydides as
to what should be defined as threatening. But, what
it can and should find is education both on how great
powers behave and what the hazards may prove to be
in that behavior. The definition of future threat should
encourage prudential defense planning in line with
the country’s desired, albeit self-disciplined, role and
responsibility in the international system.
Risk and danger cannot be eschewed and thereby
avoided conclusively, but the whole record of strategic
history offers education in the high value of balancing
power. I must add hastily that history also warns of
the practical difficulty in achieving such balance, and
especially of the risks and danger that are apt to beset
the pursuit of immoderate greatness. Preeminent unilateral hegemony will always be challengeable sooner
or later, typically the former, but it need not be effected in a power transition process fatal for world order.
Power transition necessarily has characterized all of
strategic history, but to date, of course, it has never
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been coerced or negotiated in the context of nuclear
armament. American preeminence as a, and then the
only, superpower for a while in the 1990s is particularly peril-prone both because of its nuclear backstop and
the reluctance or even inability of many Americans to
see themselves as they need to in the great stream of
human history. U.S. superstate prominence has been
a physical and psychological reality since 1943–44,
but this reality requires understanding as a passing
dynamic episode contextual in history.
When, as here, we think about future threat, we
have to consider how the United States may best continue to perform a benign hegemonic role in international security. There is a problem in that Americans
have difficulty understanding that their country, notwithstanding its unique features, in the last analysis
simply is yet another state that has no practicable
choice other than to play the game of nations along
with everyone else. There is only one game, and it has
proceeded through all of strategic history from the
time of Athenian and Spartan competitive preeminence until today. Contemplating the future threat to
security, we should proceed unconfused by our domestic ideology of uniqueness. Future threat will lurk
in the malign influence of foreigners’ fear, their energetic determination to protect their reputations, and
in their definition of national interests that may not be
compatible with our own.
Thucydides wrote about the great war of his lifetime, on the safe assumption that there would be other
great wars in other times involving other polities. He
was unsparing of human folly and error, and he believed that his revelation of such might have some
useful benign educational effect. Following the Greek
author in spirit at least, I believe that a robustly and
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sufficiently evidenced grasp of how states need to behave in order to balance power is key to preserving the
international order vital to future security. Ironically
perhaps, America’s ability to define future threat in a
way conducive to the protection of important values
is hindered by the experience and legacy of extraordinary national hegemony. This is understandable, even
if not well understood currently. An important source
of difficulty lies in the relative modernity of active
American participation in the game of nations. The
genuine risks and dangers of the Cold War served in
practice to hide the fact that the great Soviet–American Cold War was far from unprecedented in strategic
history, save only for the uniquely challenging addition of weapons of mass destruction to the equation of
high risk.
It would be misleading to characterize effort for
the future threat definition as an attempt to return international politics to a more normal multipolar condition, following the decades of bipolar Cold War, the
unipolarity of the 1990s, and the unprofitable, if wellintentioned endeavors to remake backward realms
in the anti-jihadist 2000s. But, given that the United
States was not a very serious player in international
politics prior to World War II, it is scarcely surprising
that the country has relatively little understanding of
how and why international politics are played as they
are. Contrary to appearances, this is not meant to be
critical. American statecraft culturally is what it is, reflecting somewhat the novelty of the national experience. This discussion does not seek to engage combatively with an American culture that reflects somewhat
the dominant national experience.32 The challenge
here is to explore the best way the United States, with
its distinctive and quite recent historical experience,
can cope with the challenge of defining future threat.
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A key reason why it is advisable to accept the concept of prudence as having merit superior to alternatives is because it is the idea that most exactly captures
the critical difference between a risk and a danger.
Moreover, prudence is a concept that, in theory at
least, suggests in its required focus upon consequences how potential dilemmas should be approached and
met. Unfortunately, causes for concern in international politics do not appear on policymakers’ desks helpfully labelled either as risky or dangerous, while their
actuality or their potentiality for harm may well encourage uncomfortably subjective and unmistakably
uncertain threat assessment. It is prudent to be clear
in one’s own mind about the distinction between risk
and danger, albeit while ascertaining the necessarily
subjective character of the judgment offered. Logically, a risk is a potential way station that can be en route
to another condition, which one may well judge to be
dangerous. Given that danger is a realized condition,
accurately perceived or not, risk has to be regarded
as a quality contributing to the maturing of incipient
peril. Plainly, the ascending peril between risk and
danger is captured adequately in the language used.
Where the idea of prudence intrudes most usefully is
in its ability to suggest persuasively that there is a vitally important difference between the two. Poor statecraft and strategy, unaided by the insight required by
and for prudence, will be prone to conflate risks and
danger, with the result that we may miss important
possibilities for the control of escalation in menace.
Because of its significantly open nature, the concept of the future lends itself easily to abuse by theorists who are not careful in their choice of words, either because of what may be attributed to mischievous
aforethought or, more likely, simply because they are
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theorizing beyond their normal comfortable intellectual depth. One reason we should seek to discipline
our choice in conceptual usage is because we do not
know the best way to influence the future: at the very
least, we should take care to avoid misusing concepts
that might do unanticipated damage to our security.
The problem most central to this discussion is the unavoidable fact that we are unable to foresee the future.
When our intelligence community looks forward in
time, it is trying to identify the consequences of past,
current, and future historical phenomena. A determination to be alert to consequences translates as a
commitment to prudence. Such a commitment does
not necessarily mean the attempted eschewal of risk,
including ones that could be dangerous on any reasonable assessment. Instead, what would be meant,
certainly implied, is that the possible consequences
of our behavior, positive and negative, would be considered seriously. Given the unavoidably speculative
nature of all futurology, it is always more or less difficult to ensure that political and strategic decisions
about the future that are popular are subjected to
honest assay.
The defining of future threat is a behavior exceptionally inviting to the ill-deserved authority of hope
over realistic expectation. This discussion now must
address key issues pertaining to assumptions and
evidence that should not be permitted to slide out of
sight inadequately treated.
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When Is a Threat Not a Threat? Assumptions
and Evidence.
Probably the soundest judgment on the general
problem of threat definition for the future was drafted
a generation ago by Professor Klaus Knorr of Princeton University. The professor advised with these wellconsidered words:
The act of threat perception creates an image of reality; it is a device, a hypothesis. Indeed, this holds true
of all perception. All human awareness is a personal
construct, something that we organize. It is a set of
assumptions that deals with the outside world selectively, focusing on some components while screening
out others. We continuously “bet” about the nature
of reality. Preexisting assumptions (i.e., theories)
about the outside world help us to select our “bet.”
But for this very reason, they hinder, as well as help,
perception.33

The other intellectual difficulty vis-à-vis threat
perception is that it concerns the future, and often
not just the immediate future. There is no information whatever about the future. The political and social phenomena that are objects of threat perceptions
change over time. Even if we know what is true today,
we could not know what will be true tomorrow. As
historical accounts demonstrate again and again, state
behavior is highly unpredictable. It can change suddenly; surprise is frequent and not rarely dramatic. All
we can do is speculate on the shape of future events
by studying the relevant (especially the recent) past.
The mere projection into the future of what we have
learned about the past already has been pointed out,
is extremely hazardous.
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Defining future threat is a speculative enterprise
that invariably requires the making of decisions on
our part that quite literally cannot be justified with
reference to hard and definite evidence. For the defense planner, the future is a foreign country overpopulated with situational possibilities abundantly full of
threat potential. Because the United States is choosing
to remain a (if not the only) global superpower, the
threat horizon of the future is well populated. But, we
need to ask, just what is a threat and what makes it
so? Because the subject lies in the future, there cannot be direct evidence of such threat. What is available, however, is contemporary and recent evidence
of behavior and, at least inferable, policy motive, set
in the long-term historical context of our understanding of the politics of statecraft. We can know with
tolerable reliability what states have done or sought
to do recently, and we can speculate with some confidence about the likelihood of contextual continuity in
respect of American interests that may be menaced.
However, what we cannot do is predict and expect
“Black Swan” events or episodes that are, by definition, highly improbable yet potentially and systemically very disruptive in our context of most concern
here to the American threat horizon.34 A Black Swan
is an event as unexpected as it proves profound in its
consequences. Such occurrences are as startlingly surprising as they are seemingly transformative of prior
patterns in near habitual behavior.
It seems unlikely that the outside world will come
in haste in the near term to the political rescue of
American threat definition with respect to its Army.
Menace to particular American interests is locatable
worldwide but, both fortunately and unfortunately,
currently there is not a single dominant threat filling
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the horizon. The most prudent conclusion to draw
from the current international security context needs
to be a distinctly unheroic, but defensibly sensible, determination not to bet extravagantly on any particular
category of strategic challenge. The U.S. Army has
endured turbulent recent decades of late.
1. In the 1970s, it sought to recover from the diverse but heavy damage suffered in Vietnam.
2. In the 1980s, it was adapting and adjusting both
to exciting new technologies (still largely prospective)
and to a Soviet threat in Europe that had matured and
expanded since the late-1960s.
3. The 1990s saw the Army seeking to make some
sense of the highly fashionable RMA and later the
transformation possibilities and debates, but the absence from the near horizon of a major dominant military threat considerably undermined the plausible relevance of expert proposals about the technical-tactical
frontier and beyond.
4. The 2000s witnessed and appeared to require
the return of counterinsurgency. COIN rode again,
not least in counterterrorist regard, in the sharpest of
contrast to the Army’s foci in the two previous postVietnam decades.35
In summary form, the U.S. Army has experienced
decades of: recovery and reform (1970s); modernization for high-end warfare (1980s); fundamental uncertainty and retreat into technical visions of RMA (1990s);
and COIN and counterterrorism (2000s). The point
that really matters in this discussion is not any particular focus and the political policy and strategy behind
it. Rather, it is the fairly obvious lesson that policy,
particularity with strategic choices for the Army in the
future, cannot be anticipated with high confidence. It
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would be hard to design strategically more distinctive
decades of dominant experience for the U.S. Army
than those experienced from the 1960s through the
2000s. The politically dominant strategic reality for
the Service was radically different from decade to decade. This is the historical context for consideration of
future threat definition. More to the relevant point is
the function performed for us by Thucydides in his
Peloponnesian War, given the transhistorical theory of
state behavior that it carries. Thucydides cannot tell us
what, or even might, emerge as a threat to security in
the remainder of the 21st century, but his understanding and explanation of how and why states behave as
they do has profound advisory implications for our
contemporary choices in policy and strategy.36
Because of operation of the laws of physics, we
can secure no grip upon future happenings, no matter
how convinced we may be in their anticipation. But
what we can know about the future should prove sufficiently serviceable to allow for prudent choices on
the shape and composition, size, and equipment of the
Army. With much gratitude toward Thucydides, and
also as a result of careful study of strategic history, we
can identify prudent choices in military posture. This
is not a simple matter, because the would-be threat
definer, perhaps diviner, needs to be fully alert to the
following: the power of accident; strategy’s adversarial nature; Black Swan possibilities; enduring human
tendencies with conflictual implications (e.g., political
process and the implications of fear and anxiety); and
the potency of needful ambiguity inherent in much
about defense planning and preparation.
It is commonplace, indeed it is only sensible, for
defense plans to be specifically contextual to the point
of potential political embarrassment. Defense plan-
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ners as strategists necessarily inhabit a world wherein
there are enemies, certainly adversaries, and threat
possibilities in the day after tomorrow, if not tomorrow itself (else why conduct the planning?). However,
even though threat definition can carry some risk of
being self-validating as military professionals simply
perform their professional task of preparing for what
might happen, such preparation is only prudent. It is
important not to forget that the concept, and indeed
the principle, of prudence in defense planning means
that one must be alert to the dangers that could lie
as consequences derivative in part from errors in the
plans. Because it makes no sense to seek from the military an understanding of the future that it cannot obtain as a reliable certainty by any known method, we
have no practicable alternative other than to settle for
an understanding of future strategic need that should
be able to rest well enough on our comprehension of
the past. We should seek to identify what scholars of
strategic history suggest is possible, if not probable.
Also, we need to appreciate that, although each period in history may have its own distinctive pattern
in events with plausibly presumable motivation, such
distinctions are only differences in character, not in
nature in the great stream of time.
Learning from History.
History teaches nothing; it is not an agent with
motives active on the course of events.37 But, history
is by far the best educator for our strategic future.38
While we cannot and must not hunt earnestly, though
inevitably failingly, for historical analogies to our
emerging challenges, we can and should seek assistance, perhaps inspiration, in the intellectual construct
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known as the “historical parallel.”39 What is claimed
using this concept is that the course of events “then”
(i.e., whenever) would appear to have shown important features in common with a contemporary track
of events of our own recently. To hazard a theatrical
comparison, what we would be suggesting would
be that much of the state setting appears substantially common to “then and now,” while probably
also today’s adversarial contest appears to have had
antecedents in motive and perhaps even in results
in past periods. The episodically protracted British
strategic experience on the northwest frontier of India is a compelling example of a strategic context that
could be regarded plausibly as historically noticeably parallel to the situation in Helmand Province of
Afghanistan in the 2000s.40
I am careful to distinguish between the analogy
and the historical parallel, because the former is fundamentally empirically unsound. History does not
repeat itself in ways essential for analogy to deserve
authority, but most certainly in contrast, it does repeat
itself in the situations that its strategic course poses
to policymakers and strategists. It would be difficult
to exaggerate the significance of this distinction. To
recognize an apparent case of historical parallelism is
to notice similarities that may be important between
the cases from different historical periods, but that is
all. Unfortunately, analysts often latch on to obvious
common elements (e.g., Kandahar in the 1880s and
the 2000s) between historical episodes in the hope of
discovering keys to past success or failure by (inappropriate) analogy. Strategic history simply is too varied in its dynamics and its changing contextual detail
for analogy to serve as a valuable source of guidance.
There is no alternative to the securing of detailed con-
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temporary contextual knowledge. Old methods cannot be relied upon to continue to be true, if they ever
were, just because they may have been well tried in
the past.
My intention here is not to condemn or even discourage efforts to seek educational value from understanding the course of strategic history; it is only to
advise that such value cannot be found by attempting to analogize in detail from times past. There is
no adequate substitute for current knowledge of the
details that change. We can and should learn from
history about the nature and even the character of future threat. Threat always matures and emerges from
causes inherent to the nature of international politics,
its statecraft, and its strategy. Thucydides knew and
could explain this in the Athens of the 5th century
B.C., and his explanation reads convincingly for our
era also. What does promote great confusion is the
popular tendency to neglect the difference identified
here as that which lies between the nature and the
character of threat. Probably it would be more accurate to focus on the enduring reasons why threat is an
eternal problem, though arguably it is most usefully
considered with reference to its nature.
The point of overwhelming significance for this
discussion simply is that threat—past, present, and
future—is a persistent phenomenon, one consequent
upon the enduring need for provision of human security, expressed in political systems that organize for
collective protection. Distinctive polities must exist
in a whole world of politics, and the relations among
them have always been prone to aggravation and
anxiety, occasioned by concerns about security. As
American defense planners confront the empirically
more than marginally mysterious future, they know
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for certain that anxiety, and periodically even some
alarm, about national security will characterize the
future. There will be no conclusively happy ending
to security fears. The precise character of such alarm
cannot currently be anticipated reliably, but the defense community has to be alert to their probable and
even possible manifestation, as well as to the causes of
anxiety that are actual and current. Important though
contemporary details of plausible menace certainly
are, it is scarcely less significant to grasp the fact of
the certainty of change. Future threat, both empirical
as physical hardware and also as foreign intention in
our perception, is always in process of some change.
The definition of threat changes constantly community-wide. Probably more often than in the physical
respect, threat definition shifts as a result of changes
in political evaluation.
It may be recalled that much earlier in this monograph, I deployed the familiar bare formula that notionally identified threat = capability x intention. The
former typically takes considerable passage of time
and notable expenditure of effort to achieve, while
the latter can change in a matter of hours. That is
not very helpful for would-be scientific appraisal of
intensity of threat level, but it is essential to grasp
as contextual reality. Notwithstanding some of the
aspirations for certainty of knowledge by social science, threat definition and analysis must ever remain
an art. Just as governments, let alone key individual
statesmen, cannot make vital decisions based upon
a true certainty of knowledge of probable consequences, so definition of threat to national security
must always ascend, or descend, to being a matter of
human judgment.
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The strategic history of times past, both far and
relatively near, cannot provide a reliable source of
evidence as to what should or should not be defined
as a future threat to the United States. The reason is
because contextual detail must be as significant in
the future as it was in the past. It is the beginning of
wisdom for defense planners to understand why they
ought not seek the literally unknowable. National security planning today cannot sensibly aspire to find its
logic on much understanding of, say, the second half
of the 2020s or of the 2030s; that might be deemed reliable. But, fortunately, such understanding, especially
of particular menaces, is not necessary for American
defense planning to be judged tolerably prudent. Unquestionably reliable detail concerning future threat
neither exists nor can be generated, given the rarity
as well as the scale of the unknown (including the
“unknown unknowns”).41 Consequently, our defense
community should be satisfied to be guided by an understanding of possibilities, especially of those that
current context and recent events indicate as belonging close to what can be categorized as probabilities.
This is what should be understood by a prudent approach to national security. Preeminently, prudent
definition of threat to American national security has
to be an exercise in the analysis of a reasonable projection of the consequences judged probable, or certainly
possible, that would follow as a result of serious error in defense planning. To repeat, this is art rather
than science.
Probably the definitive terse explanation of state
behavior was offered by Thucydides in his rendering
of the Athenian reasoning behind its impressive, if ultimately fatal, bid for undue imperial greatness. In the
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Athenians’ attributed words (of 432 B.C., just prior to
the war) provided by Thucydides:
That [Athenian] empire we acquired not by violence,
but because you were unwilling to prosecute to its
conclusion the war against the [Persians] barbarians,
and because the allies attached themselves to us and
spontaneously asked us to assume command. And
the nature of the case first compelled us to advance
our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honor and interest afterwards
came in.42

When we contemplate the international political
and strategic context of this 21st century, it is only prudent for us to be alert to the need for a wisdom in national security planning that should be ready enough
to cope with challenges to the United States that probably will be ineradicable from the context of contemporary international relations. Even if a Thucydidean
fear does not grip the United States, it has to be judged
likely that such a dangerous condition of anxiety may
well grip Beijing or Moscow, of course, with potentially dangerous consequences for us. Such fear has been
lethally, if episodically, characteristic of most international political systems, not least among them our
own. It must be a duty of our threat definers to seek to
encourage provision of American response that is both
adequate in discouragement of hostile initiatives and
likely to prove encouraging of moderation abroad. At
this present time, we do not know how smoothly a
process of power transition between the United States
and China will be for either side. In truth, neither a
crystal ball nor historical scholarship can be of much
assistance to American defense planners today: the
strategic future is not knowable in important detail.
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However, we do know of the need to be alert to the
danger in a major process of international political
transition of power. Prudence, as a guiding light, is
the basic requirement for our national security in the
decades ahead. Threat definition will change in character of detail, but a fundamentally prudent American
national security posture should be well able to cope,
notwithstanding the uncertainty in anticipation.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Prudence and Ignorance.
Because the future is unknown and unknowable in
detail, it is the duty of the American military establishment to be as ready to confront and defeat threats as
society’s contemporary political support allows. The
ability to define future threat is not a skill that can be
taught. Highly relevant, indeed vitally necessary, data
is missing. Prudence is the most useful concept that
should be adopted as the idea most fitting for authoritative service in the current era. A prudent defense
must be one tolerant of some error. The United States
cannot promote its global interests equally regardless of character and intensity of menace. But it can
and should be ready to respond to broad categories
of security challenge. Just how broad is a matter for
political decision superior to that under consideration
here as threat definition. It has to be understood that
there are two distinctive, albeit related, aspects of the
future threat challenge. On the one hand, there is the
necessity for Americans to decide what is and what
is not a threat, as contrasted with a risk or residual
source of danger. On the other hand, it is necessary to
understand what might be done about the apparent
menace in question.
42

Because it remains the global superpower, the
United States is exceedingly reluctant to appear indifferent to the security anxieties of its clients. The United
States is learning today what has been true at all times
and in all places in the past, that the sovereign “working level” of threat definition often devolves in undesirable practice upon some of the threat definer’s clients in the ranks of the net security provider’s foreign
dependents. A prudent defense is one that is ready
enough to meet threats that have matured or perhaps
erupted less than was well anticipated in years previously. The extraordinary geopolitical, and hence
geostrategic, scope of America’s foreign security provision is the source of exceptional, though certainly
not historically unprecedented, anxiety. While identifiable potential dangers great and small need to be
covered for potential military intervention, the United
States has to be willing and able to attend productively to the structure of security in different regions
around the world. The purpose of a prudent defense
is to provide sufficient security for whatever may occur. Because precision in the definition of future threat
is impossible, it is necessary to limit future ambition to
the ability to cope with menaces by broad categories
of risk and possible danger. Obviously, it has to follow that American military power needs to be notably
mobile and friendly to jointness of enterprise.
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Definition of Threat.
There are fortunately very few threats that all but
demand to be so interpreted by their political owners. Russian modernization of its strategic nuclear
forces and Chinese modernization and large-scale
augmentation of its naval assets with obvious access-denial relevance spring to mind as unarguable
contemporary examples of military developments
abroad that plainly are intended to convey the idea
of threat to the United States, at least to America’s
long-standing interests. However, Americans should
recognize that although their country is, in an important sense, simply another great state in strategic history’s lengthy procession of such, a combination of
technology and historical circumstance has rendered
the American role in international security truly exceptional. Imperial Athens was the proud possessor
of distinctively unusual greatness in the 5th century
B.C., but it discovered painfully that such greatness
did not always translate into a usable superiority of
power, e.g., in Egypt and later in Sicily.43 The contrast, but also some similarities, with the American
experience from the 1960s until today almost beg for
explicit notice.
This is in no danger of becoming argument, let
alone assertion, by claimed historical analogy. But it
is notice of historical parallelism. A problem inherent
in the very nature of empire, even of loose imperium
such as that led by the contemporary United States, is
that it proves impossible to know when to decide that
the level of security currently attained can be judged
sufficient. To go back to basics, one has to ask “Why
might a threat be so designated?” Admittedly, there
are some threats that lend themselves to metric analy-
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sis, or at least appear to do so. However, even in a
case where the strategic mathematics could be grim,
it cannot be denied that the answer to the most characteristic of strategist’s questions, “So what?” may not
be beyond all reasonable doubt. The point of note is
that the real definition, especially with respect to the
future, almost always is a zone for political deliberation and final judgment. In other words, definition of
future threat can safely be assumed a matter allowing some discretion. Few threats are really self-defining. They do not emerge fully mature as to most
likely consequences should they fail to be answered
effectively today. The course of history, including
history of a strategic kind, is a rat’s nest of potential
causes and possible effects. Definition of future threat
has to include effort to discern possible and probable
second- and third-order effects. Given that often it is
distinctly challenging even to anticipate with tolerable
accuracy what a first-order effect will be, it should be
plain enough to see that threat definition is very much
an art and, moreover, is one for which the military
intelligence officer needs to be well prepared by rich
strategic historical exposure.
Historical Parallels Are the Norm,
Not the Exception.
Our contemporary lives oblige us to be alert to
change, as great and small challenges that are new
to us personally require attention. It is all a matter of
perspective. It can be difficult even to appreciate the
probable fact of historical parallels that should be of
educational merit for us. The issues of the day press
upon us, each seemingly sufficiently novel as to stretch
beyond feasibility of significant alleviation by the
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application of methods long understood, well tried,
and by and large true enough. An important theme for
this analysis has been the eternal relationship between
continuity and change. The reason American defense
professionals should read and study Thucydides’ admittedly challenging text is because his political and
strategic world was not fundamentally different from
ours.44 This means that his book should be regarded
as a work of rare insight on a subject contemporary to
the author that, in its essential features, has not really
altered for nearly 2 1/2 thousand years.
Of course, the differences between then and now
are important, but they were changes that did not alter
the nature of political relations among states by revolutionary impact or by cumulative adjustment over
time. Indeed, it can be close to shocking to moral aspirations for our world, to be brought by facts to realize
just how parallel the course of history often has been
over millennia. The scope and depth of the historical
parallelism typically is obscured from most of our
notice by the necessary focus we have to place upon
the challenges of today or upcoming tomorrow. Now
inevitably has some novel features, novel in detail to
us that is, though rarely so in prospective function. Because we have to be more or less genuinely expert in
understanding our situation and its problems today,
it is scarcely surprising that the true implications of
the reality behind the concept of the great stream of
time rarely achieve due recognition. Also, it is difficult to argue for the contemporary relevance of a text
from ancient Greece, when the argument is advanced
and sustained only by a small handful of scholars,
whereas a wholly contemporary approach to our
problem regularly is attended by a cast of hundreds or
even thousands.
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Perhaps the greatest challenge to clarity of understanding lies in the fact that Thucydides offers education rather than training. Much as Clausewitz wrote
a book designed to help prepare soldiers to be competent in making the practical decisions they would
have to make in war, so Thucydides wrote a generally
pitiless history of the realities of disaster and triumph,
genius and folly, and everything in between. The
grand continuity that we find in the strategic dimension to the great stream of time is attributed largely to
the persistence of just three elements over millennia:
(1) a human nature with motives that do not change;
(2) our exclusivity of political organization(s) to provide security; and (3) the logic of strategy that is an
enduring reality, even though its practice frequently
is not conducted competently.
American Exceptionalism Is a Half-Truth.
The exceptionalist literature, both scholarly and
popular, is right in dwelling upon the ways in which
the United States differs from all other polities on
Earth—up to a point, at least. Unfortunately, no matter how elevated the moral or cultural and political the
exceptionalist claims are believed to be (in America),
the unforgiving nature of international politics applies no less to the United States than it does to other,
lesser, polities. The United States is truly exceptional
in its size, in the sheer weight of domestic assets that
it brings to the game of nations, and as a direct consequence in the power as influence that it can exercise.
The definition of future threat that is our organizing
challenge to analyze and explain here probably should
be understood not to derive significantly from those
domestic features of the American experiment, of
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which we Americans understandably tend to be most
proud. It is plausible to argue that our public values
(and often private personal ones, also) add spice to
the flavor of our foreign policy. But it is rather more
plausible to argue that our great power, understood
as relative influence, will continue to be the principal
reason for our particular role in world political affairs.
The United States was the weightier side of an essentially bipolar balance all through the protracted
Cold War, and we have remained preeminent, if now
imminently challenged by China, for more than 2 decades thereafter. However, preeminence, even a relatively benign American form of hegemony, comes at
a societal price that can be heavy. At the time of this
writing, there is unmistakably convincing evidence
that China is pursuing a generally prudent, cumulatively competitive course vis-à-vis the extant American-led order in East Asia and Asia–Pacific. The material and other evidence of competitive motivation
is undeniable, and it will certainly continue to grow,
provided domestic upheaval in China does not divert
it. This Chinese competitive urge and long-term surge
is all but obliged to be anti-American, simply because
the United States remains the power still currently in
the ascendant.
On similar logic, the new Russia can hardly avoid
regarding the United States as an adversary, since the
(American) security promise (or guarantee?) in Article
V of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Treaty of
1949 is the most essential element in the whole security pattern for (non-Russian) Eastern Europe. Russia
is certain to provide ample evidence of threat in the
future, but its relatively recent geopolitical losses and
still worsening demographic situation in combination
ought to damper risk-taking impulses in Moscow.
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However, this author finds little or no comfort in such
a seemingly reasonable judgment. Current Russian
geopolitical, geostrategic, and demographic weaknesses ought to have an effect on policy that discourages adventure, but as recent and current events have
demonstrated, this is not so.
Threat need not always flow strictly from adversaries ready enough to take crisis to the brink and beyond if the dynamics of confrontation assume an all
but organic activism that escapes careful control. Definition of future threat has to take account of the possibility of the need to face down foreign leaders who are
erratically and episodically apparently risk-tolerant to
a dangerous degree. As a general rule, I must register
a negative view of American efforts, no matter how
well intended, to remake distinctly alien foreign societies with their richly un-American cultures. Physical menace sourced in such cultures certainly should
be defined as future threat, but measures to control
it should not entail forceful and protracted American
endeavor to spread our ideas and practices.
My reason for this negative attitude is strictly
pragmatic and is abundantly evidenced empirically.
To be unmistakably explicit: the “American way”
does not work well in many foreign cultures. If we
have learned nothing else from the grim experiences
in the 2000s in Afghanistan and Iraq, surely it must
be this—it can never be sound strategy to attempt to
achieve the literally impossible. The American imbroglios in Afghanistan and Iraq have been all too
characteristic of mature hegemonic behavior, even
misbehavior. Rephrased for the purpose of this monograph, it has been characteristic of very great powers, literally over the course of millennia, not to be
sufficiently skilled in their statecraft and strategy as

49

to know when and where to stop in the quest for an
ever unreachable measure of national security. Threat
definition is especially difficult at the present time because the United States plainly is well past the peak of
its public’s willingness to bear new strategic burdens,
all the while a near-peer competitor in the form of the
People’s Republic of China assuredly is not going to
be easily discouraged from opposing the existing security arrangements in Asia–Pacific. “Uneasy lies the
head that wears the crown,” is a summative comment
appropriate to the subject here.
Chance, Black Swans, and Unknown Unknowns.
As something akin to a codicil to this whole discussion, it is advisable to remind readers of the limits
to prudent rationality in threat definition and subsequent consequential defense preparation. I must warn
that we should not be wholly unprepared for developments that may emerge as if by chance or by a process that cannot be anticipated or predicted. The point
most in need of clearest registration is that we have to
be ready enough to cope with surprising events that
could have effects very damaging to our security for
decades to come. An improbable, but certainly possible, practical alignment of Chinese and Russian policy
goals and strategy could pose a gigantic continentalist
challenge that we would find difficult to meet. In addition, we must worry about the threat that would be
posed to our conception of international order by the
world’s first, but unlikely to be last, bilateral nuclear
war. There will be many cases in the future, as there
were in the past and are in the present (e.g., consider
Gaza), of crises and wars in which the United States is
not a principal participant; nonetheless, consideration
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of future threat definition cannot be indifferent to the
incendiary potential of conflict that is almost structural to the basic dynamic functioning of the existing
world order.
It is well to remember that there has been and remains a legacy of U.S. leadership following World
War II. This is American in design, sustenance, and
still substantially American in practice, even though
the U.S. role has been increasingly muted in recent
years. Prominent among the themes in Thucydides
is the danger that can lurk underappreciated in the
obligations that a hegemonic power finds it has to its
security clients. This is a perennial cost that is an inalienable consequence of international political leadership.45 The 21st may not be strictly another American century, but it is true to say that the most likely
shape and structure of the international order yet to
come is far from self-evident at present. This very
uncertain international context makes a fundamental
case for a prudent approach to threat definition and
defense planning.
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tactical advances have galloped on, leaving strategic understanding largely shrouded in mystery.
22. The proposition that politics/policy and strategy are more
important than tactics and technology has become close to thematic in the writings of historian Williamson Murray. See his
Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change, Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 2011; Murray, War and Military Effectiveness, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2011; and
Murray and Sinnreich, eds., Successful Strategies, Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 2014.
23. Intellectual mastery of the subject of nuclear threat requires understanding of the somewhat rival theories and arguments advanced by both Thomas C. Schelling and Herman Kahn.
See Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1963; Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966; Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960;
and Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable, New York:
Avon Books, 1962. The sharp contrast between Schelling and
Kahn’s thinking on nuclear threat is an intellectual centerpiece to
Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and
Practice From the Cold War to the Twenty–First Century, Fairfax, VA:
National Institute Press, 2008.
24. A careful set of historical case studies concluded that reputation for integrity toward commitments has not been the dominant force for credibility. A superior weight of evidence supports
the proposition that political leaders are far more impressed by
their assessment of the quality of current interest an opponent ap-
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pears to have in a particular issue, rather than in that adversary’s
past record of fidelity in promised action to support declared
interests. See Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2005. This is one of those modest insights from scholarship that
can have immense practical significance. It is no exaggeration to
claim that the whole theory of deterrence in strategy may need
to be redrafted if Press is judged to have read history correctly. It
should be needless to say that it is orthodox to believe that reputation tomorrow can be at risk to perception of irresolution and
weakness today.
25. Although states and their societies have armed forces
that reflect more than casually their social roots and sustaining
influences, also it is true that war, indeed each particular war, is
a whole phenomenon that more than somewhat evolves seemingly organically, changing the style and some of the practices of
the competitive belligerents. My point is that despite the hostility
involved, a war is a dynamic episode that adversaries share. To
a meaningful degree, they must wage a single contest, and their
means and methods are certain to share some common features.
For a particularly persuasive explanation of this character of war,
see Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes, London, UK: Hurst, 2009, pp. 65, 170, 191.
26. At long last, the ideas of adaptability and adaptation have
begun to be recognized for the importance that they must have.
See Murray, Military Adaptation in War.
27. See Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Thoughts for Defence
Planners,” Survival, Vol. 52, No. 3, June–July 2010, pp. 36–38.
28. An outstanding and revealing recent report on command
experience in American context is General Stanley McChrystal,
My Share of the Task, New York: Penguin, January 2013.
29. Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss, eds., Hegemonic
Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, aired some rival views of Thucydides’ relevance
to our modern times, while a rather later assessment by David A.
Welch at least was admirably explicit in to its message to scholars: “Why International Relations Theorists Should Stop Reading
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Thucydides,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, July
2003, pp. 301–319.
30. Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides, p. 16.
31. The most helpful guide to the subject of this monograph
is Michael Howard, The Lessons of History, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, Chap. 1.
32. As Zara Steiner makes very clear indeed, the United States
was quite heavily engaged in international relations during the
1920s and 1930s, but by choice it was not really on the field of play
that contained the elements we must include as being relevant in
the category of strategic history. See the magisterial treatment of
the interwar decades in her books: The Lights That Failed: European
International History, 1919–1933, Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2005; and The Triumph of the Dark: European International
History, 1933–1939, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011.
33. Knorr, “Threat Perception,” p. 112.
34. See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of
the Highly Improbable, New York: Random House, 2007.
35. McChrystal provides an excellent participant’s view of
recent history of the U.S. Army.
36. Thucydides’ core arguments on strategy are well summarized in Athanassios G. Platios and Constantinos Koliopoulos,
Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War
and their Relevance Today, London, UK: Hurst, 2010. An essay helpfully contextual for the book by Platios and Koliopoulos is Paul A.
Rahe, “Thucydides as Educator,” in Murray and Sinnreich, eds.,
The Past as Prologue, pp. 95–110.
37. Michael Howard advises that:
history, whatever its value in educating the judgement,
teaches no ‘lessons,’ and the professional historians will be
as skeptical of those who claim that it does as professional
doctors are of their colleagues who peddle patent medicines
guaranteeing instant cures. The past is infinitely various,
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an inexhaustible storehouse of events from which we can
prove anything or its contrary. . . . historians may claim to
teach lessons, and often they teach very wisely. But ‘history’
as such does not.

Lessons of History, p. 11.
38. I advance this claim on behalf of historical education in
my book, Strategy and Defence Planning.
39. The concept of the historical parallel avoids the impossible difficulties with analogy, while being encouraging of potentially fruitful search for enlightening similarities in the structure
of diverse historical episodes. I am pleased to acknowledge debts
to Klaus Knorr and Michael Howard for my appreciation of the
merit in this idea. Knorr, “Threat Perception”; Howard, The Lessons of History, Chap. 1.
40. See the following small gem of a book, General Sir Andrew
Skeen, Lessons in Imperial Rule: Instructions for British Infantrymen
on the Indian Frontier, (1932) London, UK: Frontline Books, 2008.
41. Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, New
York: Sentinel, 2011, p. xiii.
42. Thucydides, A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian
War, p. 43.
43. Ibid., pp. 56, 128.
44. No less an authority than General of the Army George
Catlin Marshall told an audience at Princeton University on
February 22, 1947, that he doubted:
whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep
convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the
period of the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens.

Quoted in Paul A. Rahe, “Thucydides as Educator,” in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds., The Past as
Prologue, p. 99.
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45. See Thucydides, A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian
War, pp. 53–54. Because it rests largely on an historical narrative
structure, Thucydides’ great book is not designed in the manner of our contemporary social science text books, with chapters
discretely targeted to develop particular ideas or theories. As a
consequence, one finds a particular phenomenon (e.g., alliance
behavior and misbehavior) integrated into the whole of the narrative, which is to say in proper historical context. Consideration of
alliance or client, relationships in Thucydides is assisted usefully
by the following works: Donald Kagan, Thucydides: The Reinvention of History, New York: Viking, 2009; and Platios and Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy. While Athens was a strategically giant
ally, it was inevitably a greatly resented collector of security tribute, too. On balance, both then and now, it is a persisting reality of
international politics that the dominant partner in a relationship
of security dependency finds that it must adopt some local causes
of concern, ambition, and anxiety in the interest of tolerable alliance relations. Small security-dependent clients are fully capable
of manipulating a very great power into an imprudent commitment to provide assistance.
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